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PROMISES AND PATERNALISM*
E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH*
Consider the case of Jack Tallas, an immigrant from Greece
who had achieved considerable success as an insurance agent
and landlord during the nearly seventy years he spent working
in Salt Lake City.' Jack, who lived in a hotel during the last
years of his life, wanted to give $50,000 to Peter Dementas, a
close friend of fourteen years, who had helped him during that
time.2 Jack dictated a memorandum to Peter in Greek.' It stated
that Jack owed Peter, who "treats me like a father and I think
of ... as my own son," $50,000 for his kindness in having Jack at
weekly dinners with Peter's family, his help in driving Jack to
the doctor, and his assistance in the management of Jack's rent-
* This Essay was presented as the 1999 George Wythe Lecture at the William
and Mary School of Law on March 25, 1999. Parts of it are based on E. ALLAN
FARNSWoRTH, CHANGING YOUR MIND: THE LAW OF REGREMD DECISIONS (1998),
Copyright © by E. Allan Farnsworth, and used with permission.
** Alfred McCormack Professor of Law at Columbia University and Reporter for
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.
1. See Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 631 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
2. See id.
3. See id.
385
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
al property.4 The memorandum promised that Jack would
change his will to make Peter an "heir" and leave him $50,000.'
Jack kept the Greek document, retyped it in English, notarized
the English version with his own notary seal, and delivered the
documents to Peter three days later.' Jack died six weeks later,
leaving behind a substantial estate, but bequeathing nothing to
Peter.
7
Too bad for Peter, decided an appellate court in Utah.8 Jack's
promise was unenforceable because there was no consideration
for it. 9 Jack's intention to be bound legally could not have been
clearer, but this was not enough. Not only was such an intention
insufficient, but no formality would have been enough. Utah law
afforded Jack no means of making an enforceable promise to
make a gift to Peter.0 Jack could, of course, have gone to the
trouble of changing his will and having it witnessed, but even
then he would have been free to change his will again.
I want to convince you that for centuries the common law's
treatment of promises such as Jack's-promises to make
gifts-has been profoundly paternalistic. So let me at the outset
explain what I mean by paternalism. It is commonly said that a
legal rule is paternalistic if, for a person's "own good," it prohib-
its the person from doing something, such as using drugs, or re-
quires the person to do something, such as wearing a helmet
while cycling. I will use paternalism more broadly to include
legal rules that for a person's "own good" disable that person
from making a binding commitment, such as making an enforce-
able promise to give up relief under the bankruptcy laws." I will
4. See id.
5. See id. at 629, 631.
6. See id. at 629.
7. See id.
8. See id. at 634.
9. See id. at 633.
10. See id. (indicating that Jack's promise might have been enforceable if Utah
followed the "moral obligation" doctrine).
11. This usage is consistent with that of the philosopher John Stuart Mill, whose
one exception to the prohibition against paternalism was selling oneself into slavery.
See JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 121 (Alan Ryan ed., 1997) (1859); see also An-
thony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 765
(1983) (agreeing with Mill "that some paternalistic restrictions on contractual free-
dom are . . . permissible").
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then apply this notion of paternalism to a broad category of
promises: promises to make gifts. As suggested by the examples
of drug use, helmets, and bankruptcy, paternalism can some-
times be justified, but in a legal system that prizes freedom of
contract, we ought to eschew paternalistic restraints on that
freedom. I intend to show that it is mainly for a promisor's "own
good" that our rules of contract law trump the preferences of a
promisor who, like Jack, seeks to make a binding promise to
make a gift and that there is no justification for this paternalis-
tic intervention.
Because my argument assumes that a promisor, such as Jack,
might have a preference for making a binding promise to make a
gift, I turn to the reasons why that might be so. In most cases, a
promisor wants to be able to make a binding promise because of
self-interest. In order to get something that the promisor wants,
such as a new Ferrari or a promise of one, the promisor has to
make a promise to pay the price of the Ferrari. Furthermore, it
is in the promisor's self-interest that the promise be binding, for
otherwise the seller will balk at delivering or at promising to
deliver the car. In such transactions we exchange our promises
for things, including other promises, that we want; however,
that is not always so. Jack did not exchange his promise for
something he wanted. Rather, Jack promised to make a gift.
Jack's situation thus raises a question as to why someone would
promise to make a gift.
Before asking why one makes such a promise, it may be well
to ask why one makes a gift. Is it pure altruism-an unselfish
regard for the interests of others? Altruism unalloyed, as in the
classic case of the saintly person who gives a fortune to a beg-
gar, is a rare if praiseworthy commodity.1" Saint Anthony, we
are told,
was twenty years old when he heard these words of Jesus
read in the church: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou
hast, and give to the poor!" At once Anthony sold all his
12. As to whether there is such a "thing as a simply generous and unself-interest-
ed gift," see Carol M. Rose, Giving Some Back-A Reprise, 44 FLA. L. REV. 365, 365-
68 (1992). On the effects of altruism on organ donors, see ROBERTA G. SIMMONS ET
AL., GIFT OF LIFE at xviii (1987).
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goods, gave the profit to the poor, and went off to the desert
to become a hermit. 3
Today, however, most significant gifts are made either to some-
one in one's circle of friends or family, or to a charity. Those who
make them are not motivated solely or even primarily by altru-
ism.
According to fundraisers for higher education: "The most
promising models of donor behavior favor exchange over pure
altruism: They say donors are motivated by receiving 'goods' in
exchange for gifts, and a repeated disequilibrium leaves donors
with a need to respond to recognition and acknowledgement
with even more gifts." 4 To say that one asks for nothing in re-
turn is not to say that one expects nothing in return. For exam-
ple, when real estate developer Samuel LeFrak promised to give
$10 million to the Guggenheim Museum in New York City, he
said that he made the promise "with no strings attached," mean-
ing that he asked for nothing in return.15 It was understood,
however, that he expected to see his name on the outside of the
museum's rotunda, and it surely came as no surprise when he
was reported to be rethinking his decision after th6 New York
City Landmarks Preservation Commission refused to approve
this form of recognition.' 6
Such an expectation of an enhanced reputation is only one of
many reasons for making a gift.'7 In the case of a gift to a charity,
13. THE GOLDEN LEGEND OF JACOBUS DE VORAGINE 99 (Granger Ryan & Helmut
Ripperger trans., 1941).
14. Thomas R. Pezzullo & Barbara E. Brittingham, The Study of Money, CUR-
RENTS, July-Aug. 1990, at 44. For a classic study of how, in archaic societies, ex-
change itself is sometimes driven by obligations to give, receive, and repay, see
MARCEL MAuSS, THE GIFT: FORMS AND FUNCTIONS OF EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIc SOCIET-
IES (Ian Cunnison trans., 1967). As to the importance of peer pressure among
wealthy philanthropists, see FRANCIE OSTROWER, WHY THE WEALTHY GIVE: THE CUL-
TURE OF ELITE PHILANTHROPY (1995).
15. Carol Vogel, Clash over Name Puts Museum Gift in Doubt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
17, 1994, § 1, at 13.
16. See id. (stating that the Guggenheim Museum put LeFrak's name on its fifth-
floor gallery).
17. Shortly before Christmas in 1993, multimillionaire Victor Posner gave $2 mil-
lion to the homeless in Florida to avoid going to jail for tax evasion. See Manny
Garcia & David Hancock, Posner Doles Out $2 Million to Homeless, MIAMI HERALD,
Dec. 22, 1993, at 1B, available in WESTLAW, News Library, MIA-HRLD File. It
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one might expect to gain tax advantages."8 In the case of a gift
to a relative or friend, as in Jack's case, one might hope for love
and affection or, if death seems near, better treatment in the
hereafter. A decision to give often results from a complex mix-
ture of these and other motives that sometimes are difficult to
identify. 9 Although one may get something in return for one's
gift, one does not get it as the result of a swap. Despite the ex-
change, there is no bargain.
Whatever Jack's reasons for his initial decision to give
$50,000 to Peter, Jack's decision was not to make a present
gift. 20 Why defer the gift?21 Perhaps he wanted the use of the
$50,000 until his death, or he did not have the money to spare
at the time of his promiae. Perhaps he had $50,000, but it was
tied up in collectibles, or he thought he could get a tax advan-
tage by deferring the payment of the $50,000. Perhaps he
thought he could earn a higher rate of return on the $50,000
than Peter could, or he was unsure of his initial decision to give
$50,000 and hoped to keep his options open.22 Whatever the ex-
planation, the $50,000 was not to be paid until Jack's death.23
Our first question remains: Why would Jack make such a
promise? If he wanted to make a deferred rather than a present
gift, why not simply tell Peter he had made a firm but nonbind-
ing resolution to leave him $50,000? Look back to the time that
Jack made the promise. To the extent that altruism motivated
might, of course, be argued that his gift was part of a swap for a promise not to
prosecute.
18. On the remarkable impact on donations of art from a 1986 change in the tax
laws, see WLIAM D. ZABEL, THE RICH DIE RICHER AND YOU CAN Too 146 (1995).
19. Nannerl 0. Keohane, then president of Wellesley College, a leading institution
in alumni donations, suggested that women differ from men in making such dona-
tions because for women "[ilt is the cause that matters, not the competition." Fox
Butterfield, As for that Myth About How Much Alumnae Give, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26,
1992, at B6.
20. See supra text accompanying note 5 ("The memorandum promised that Jack
would change his will to make Peter an 'heir' and leave him $50,000.").
21. For an analysis of this question, see Steven Shavell, An Economic Analysis of
Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401, 402 (1991).
22. Even if Jack's promise had been enforceable, Peter would have taken nothing
if Jack had exhausted all his resources during his life and left nothing to pass un-
der his will.
23. See supra text accompanying note 5.
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him, he had an interest in maximizing the benefit to Peter.24 If
Jack had actually made a gift by handing over $50,000, that gift,
being complete and irrevocable, would have been worth its face
value of $50,000 to Peter.25 Even if he had made a legally bind-
ing promise, Peter would have had to discount the value of the
gift to take into account the difficulty of enforcement should
Jack renege.26 Peter would have had to discount a nonbinding
resolution even more deeply because of the greater likelihood
that Jack would renege and the impossibility of enforcing the
resolution.
In two situations Jack might have been particularly anxious
to commit himself in order to dispel Peter's potential uncertain-
ty. First, if there was a significant chance that Peter would
mistrust Jack's resolution as not representing an actual decision
to make the gift, Jack might have wished to dispel that misap-
prehension and enhance the value of the prospect of his gift by
committing himself.28 Had Peter thought Jack untrustworthy,
Jack might have wanted to make a binding promise to make a
gift rather than a nonbinding resolution.29 Second, if there was a
significant chance that Peter would overestimate the likelihood
that Jack might change his mind, Jack might have wished to
disabuse Peter of this misapprehension in the same way.3" Had
Peter considered Jack to be excessively capricious, Jack might
have preferred a binding promise to make a gift over a
nonbinding resolution to make the same gift."1
Remember that Jack was near the end of his life. As a matter
of law, the promisor's death has the same effect as a capricious
24. See Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LE-
GAL STUD. 411, 412-14 (1977) (suggesting that interdependence is one explanation
underlying gift giving).
25. See id.
26. See id. at 414-15.
27. See id. at 412-13. For a report that many charitable organizations are moving
away from legally binding pledges in the hope that donors will give more, and that
there actually will be less attrition, see JEROLD PANAS, OFFICIAL FUNDRAISING ALMA-
NAC 33 (1989).
28. See Shavell, supra note 21, at 406, 409.
29. See id. (indicating that altruistic donors may make gifts to increase donee
reliance).
30. See id.
31. See id.
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revocation, and thus the promisor's death may be of no less
concern to the promisee than the promisor's caprice.32 Litigation
over promises to make gifts frequently arises following the
promisor's death when a rule that denies effect to the promise
favors those who will share in the promisor's estate-not the
promisor-over the promisee.3" Because the executor or adminis-
trator of the promisor's estate has a fiduciary obligation to resist
questionable claims on behalf of those who will share in the
promisors estate, extralegal sanctions have no effect.3 4 The
promisor therefore may be particularly anxious to dispel the
promisee's uncertainty in the event of death.
Having explained why Jack might have had an interest in
making an enforceable promise to make a gift to Peter, I will
now follow the story of Jack and Peter through history and trace
the influence of paternalism at seven stages: first, in the institu-
tion of the seal; 5 second, in the abolition of the institution of the
seal; 6 third, in the establishment, at least in Utah, of a substi-
tute for the seal;" fourth, in the abolition, at least in Utah, of
the substitute for the seal;38 fifth, in the common law's general
rule that denies enforcement of promises to make gifts; 39 sixth,
in the moral obligation exception to the general rule, at least as
found in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts;0 and seventh, in
the reliance exception to the general rule, at least as found in
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.41
32. See 1 SAIMEL WIISTON & RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 5.2 (4th ed. 1990) (discussing termination of the power of acceptance).
33. See- 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 2.8, at 93-94 (2d
ed. 1998) (discussing two cases that illustrate this point).
34. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 3-703(a) (amended 1997), 8 II U.LA. 138 (Supp.
1999).
35. See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
38. See infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 72-88 and accompanying text.
40. See infra notes 89-98 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text.
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THE FIRST STAGE: PATERNALISM AND THE
INSTITUTION OF THE SEAL
If Jack and Peter had lived in the nineteenth century, Jack
could have made his promise enforceable by the use of a seal.42
In medieval times, Jack would have melted wax onto a docu-
ment that recited his promise, made an impression of his per-
sonal emblem on the wax, and delivered the document with its
wax seal to Peter.48 The seal was thus an efficient means for
giving legal effect to promises that otherwise might have had
moral force at most.4 Peter would not have had to give Jack
anything in exchange for Jack's promise, nor would Peter have
had to rely on Jack's promise.45
The institution of the seal recognized a promisor's interest in
being able to make a commitment. 46 The force of the seal resided
in the fact that the promisor chose to adopt it as a formality,
and the resulting commitment rested on a recognition of the
importance to a promisor of the power to make a commitment.47
Because every promise involves an expression of an intention to
make a commitment, courts used the formality of the seal to dis-
tinguish those promises that were binding under the intention
principle from those that were not.48
What does it mean to say that the seal was a formality? For
our purposes, a formality is a ritual procedure-a ceremonial
manner of doing things-involving particular acts or special
words that a person can use to produce a desired legal conse-
quence. Rules requiring formalities do not turn on substance,
and this gives them a game-like quality. Form dominated sub-
stance in the case of a sealed document representing a debt.49
Take away the form and the legal consequences were gone: tear-
ing off the seal discharged the debt, regardless of what was
42. See 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 32, § 2.2 passim.
43. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 2.16, at 146-47.
44. See 1 id.
45. See 1 id.
46. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 96 cmt. b, illus. 1 (1981).
47. See 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 32, § 2:2, at 60-62.
48. See 1 id.
49. See 1 id.
392 [Vol. 41:385
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intended." Leave the form, however, and the legal consequences
remained: Pay the debt without cancelling or destroying the
sealed document and the debt was not discharged, again regard-
less of what was intended.51
Most legal systems know formalities as a means of distin-
guishing between transactions that are in some respect effective
and transactions that are not.52 Common ingredients of the pre-
scribed ritual include a writing, an oath, a seal, and witness-
es-sometimes with an official status.53 French law traditionally
went to remarkable lengths to provide a formality for an effec-
tive gift or promise of a gift.M After examining French law on
gifts and promises, John Dawson wrote:
When the Code spoke of authentication before "notaries" this
is what it meant, for two notaries were required, and if only
one could be found, then two other unlicensed persons must
replace the missing notary to serve as witnesses. The donor
and normally the donee would also be present. After the
terms of the transaction had all been written down, one of
the notaries must read the whole document "aloud" to the
group and all were required to sign. The only thing missing
was an indication whether the meeting must open and close
with prayer.
55
The question is why should a ritual such as this one or the one
involving a seal give legal effect to a transaction?
Scholars have lavished much ink on the functions of legal
formalities.56 For our purposes, two functions are paramount.
50. See 1 id.
51. See 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CoNTRAcTS § 205 (Wal-
ter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1957). In addition, common law did not allow the defense
of fraud, though an injunction was available in equity. See 12 id. § 1525, at 615-16.
52. See 1 WILLISTON & LORD, supra note 32, § 1:7, at 29 (suggesting that 'some
legal systems other than our own" use formal contracts to create binding contracts).
53. See JOHN P. DAWSON, GIFTS AND PROMISES 8 (1980); 1 WILLISTON & LORD,
supra note 32, § 2:2, at 59-62.
54. See, e.g., DAWSON, supra note 53, at 68-69 (illustrating the earlier French
method of "notarization").
55. Id. at 69 (footnote omitted).
56. The tripartite analysis of Lon Fuller, who described the evidentiary, caution-
ary, and channeling functions of formalities, has found particular favor with subse-
quent writers. See Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799,
800-06 (1941); see also Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of
20001 393
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One is "evidentiary"-the function of providing trustworthy
evidence of the existence and terms of the promise in case of
controversy.17 The other is "cautionary"-the function of bringing
home to the promisor the significance of promising by encourag-
ing reflection on its consequences. The cautionary function pre-
vents ill-considered decisions by prompting apprehension of
future fears. 58 Requiring a formality to serve a cautionary func-
tion is therefore an exercise in paternalism, intended to serve
the promisor's own best interests.59
THE SECOND STAGE: PATERNALISM AND THE
ABOLITION OF THE SEAL
A wax seal may have performed these functions tolerably well
in medieval England," but in the United States, few people
owned or used a seal. The ritual deteriorated to the point that
most people dispensed with wax, and printing houses simply
decorated the signature lines of'their standard forms with the
printed letters "L.S." for locus sigilli, or place of the seal.61 Per-
functory invocation of the rules for sealed documents called into
question the seal's utility in making promises enforceable. 2 By
the early part of the twentieth century, state legislatures, in-
cluding Utah's, had largely abolished the seal's efficacy." Conse-
quently, Jack could no longer use a seal to make an enforceable
promise.
If the cautionary function of the seal showed an undercurrent
of paternalism, the abolition of the efficacy of the seal showed a
Frauds: A Comment, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1971, 1983 n.14 (1996) (citing numerous
authorities influenced by Fuller's article).
57. See Fuller, supra note 56, at 800.
58. See id.
59. See id. at 800-04.
60. See 3 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 417-20 (reprint
1966) (5th ed. 1942).
61. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 2:16, at 147-49.
62. See 1 id.
63. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-2-203 (1997); Eric Mills Holmes, Stature and Sta-
tas of a Promise Under Seal as a Legal Formality, 29 WILLAMETrE L. REV. 617,
637-38, 641 & n.102. But see Donald B. Holbrook, Note, The Status of the Common
Law Seal Doctrine in Utah, 3 UTAH L. REv. 73, 75 (1952) (arguing the effectiveness
of the seal provisions in Utah).
394 [Vol. 41:385
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tide of paternalism. The legislators who deprived promisors of
the power to make binding commitments by following a simple
ritual must have concluded that it was no longer in promisors'
own best interests to have such a power.
The main impact of the abolition of the seal has been on
promises to make gifts because of the lax judicial attitude to-
ward the requirement of consideration in other contexts. If even
a "peppercorn," or a promise of a peppercorn, can amount to
consideration, most promises, except those to make gifts, will be
enforceable. As for promises where there is not even a pepper-
corn, however, the effect of the abolition of the seal was pro-
foundly paternalistic. Perhaps it reflected a decline in the belief
that individuals know and can care for their own best interests.
THE THIRD STAGE: PATERNALISM AND A
SUBSTITUTE FOR THE SEAL
The demise of the seal evoked no threnody, but it did prompt
an attempt to provide a different formality through the Uniform
Written Obligations Act.64 The Uniform Act enabled a promisor
to make a binding promise by a signed writing if it contained
"an additional express statement, in any form of language, that
the signer intends to be legally bound."65 The requirement of
such a statement was akin to the formality of the seal and
showed at least a tinge of paternalism. The drafter of the Uni-
form Act, Samuel Williston, explained: "it seems to me it ought
also to be possible that if a man makes a promise, knowing that
it is gratuitous, and, nevertheless, purposes to have it legally
binding, he shall have it so. "66 This attempt to resurrect a for-
malism was successful in only two states: Pennsylvania 6 and
Utah.6 8 Because Jack and Peter were in Utah, the Uniform Act
would have provided a formality by which Jack could have made
his promise enforceable.
64. See UNIF. WRITTEN OBLIGATIONS ACT (1925).
65. Id. § 1.
66. HANDBOOK OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM
STATE LAWS AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 35TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE 308 (1925).
67. See 33 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-8 (West 1997).
68. See Holbrook, supra note 63, at 93-94 & n.156 (citing 1929 UTAH LAWS c.92).
20001 395
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THE FOURTH STAGE: PATERNALISM AND THE
ABOLITION OF THE SUBSTITUTE FOR A SEAL
Unfortunately, however, by the time Jack made his promise,
Utah had repealed the Uniform Act.69 Utah's Code Commission-
ers concluded, in a whimsically paternalistic outburst:
[Tihat there [was] no more vicious statute in the written laws
of any civilized nation [because it would] ... enable confi-
dence men and swindlers to enforce written promises...
which they may obtain from the unwary... and to take from
such unfortunate persons a defense that has been recog-
nized... in the courts of all civilized nations since the dawn
of history.
70
These "unwary" and "unfortunate" persons were not to be trust-
ed to look after their own interests. The Uniform Act, then in
effect only in Pennsylvania, was renamed the Model Written
Obligations Act."
THE FIFTH STAGE: THE GENERAL RULE DENYING
ENFORCEMENT OF PROMISES TO MAKE GIFTS
In Utah today, as in almost all states, there is no formality
that enables a promisor to make a binding promise to make a
gift, no matter how justifiable the promisor's purpose, and no
matter how serious the promisor's intention to be bound.7 1 Prom-
ises to make gifts have sometimes been described as "sterile" to
69. In their 1931 report, the Utah Code Commissioners recommended that the
Uniform Act be repealed. See CODE COMMISSIONERS ON THE REVISION OF THE UTAH
STATUTES, REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE 19TH LEGISLATURE (1933) [hereinafter
CODE COMMISSIONERS]. The legislature's acquiescence seems to show that the legis-
lature intended that the Uniform Act be repealed. See Holbrook, supra note 63, at
94-95 & n.65.
70. Holbrook, supra note 63, at 95 n.166 (quoting CODE COMMISSIONERS, supra
note 69, at 12, 35).
71. See E. Allan Farnsworth, Promises to Make Gifts, 43 A. J. COMP. L. 359, 372
(1995).
72. If promises to make gifts were enforceable on the basis of a formality, the
remedy of specific performance would not be available if the law that once applied
to the seal was followed. Even in the heyday of the seal, a seal would not make a
gratuitous promise specifically enforceable. See 4 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, JR., EQUI-
TY JURISPRUDENCE § 1293, at 841 (reprint 1994) (Spencer W. Symons ed., 5th ed.
1941).
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suggest the insignificance of their role in commercial life. 3 The
role of such promises in contemporary society, however, is any-
thing but insignificant, as any museum, university, or religion
will attest.74
Suppose that Jack had made a present gift of $50,000 by
handing over that amount in cash to Peter. Jack's gift then
would have been irreversible and Peter could have kept the
money because of the apparently primordial notion that a gift
requires delivery.75 In Islamic law it is buttressed by the words
of the Prophet, who is reported to have said that a gift is not
valid without delivery.76 Thirteenth-century English law also
lends support to this proposition; indeed, Bracton, the famous
commentator on English laws, wrote that "[a] gift is not valid
unless livery follows." 77 In addition, nineteenth-century English
law adheres to the requirement of delivery78 and the United
States generally has accepted the delivery requirement.79
Delivery gives a gift two salient characteristics that distin-
guish it from a promise to make a gift. First, because of the
73. Lon Fuller adopted the term "sterile transmission" from the nineteenth-century
French writer Claude Bufnoir, who thought that gratuitous promises "do not present
an especially pressing case for the application of the principle of private autonomy."
Fuller, supra note 57, at 815. For criticism of the term, see Andrew Kull, Reconsid-
ering Gratuitous Promises, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 39, 49 (1992) (stating that a voluntary
transaction will not occur absent some benefit to the parties).
74. Since 1993, charitable contributions from individuals have totalled over one
hundred billion dollars a year. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 388 tbl.611 (1996).
75. French law, however, required notarization, with delivery being the exception
to this rule. See DAWSON, supra note 53, at 68.
76. See ASAF A.A. FYZEE, OUTLINES OF MUHAMMADAN LAW 230 (4th ed. 1974).
77. 2 HENRY DE BRACTON, ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 124 (Samuel
E. Thorne trans., 1968). This insistence on the delivery of personal property has
been traced to the requirement of livery of.seisin, developed in connection with
transfers of land. For a description of how livery of seisin was executed, see 3
HOLDSWORTH, supra note 60, at 188-89, 222 (describing livery of seisin as "handing
over a stick, a hasp, a ring, a cross, or a knife, which was sometimes inscribed or
curved or broken").
78. See Cochrane v. Moore, 25 L.T.R. 57 (Q.B.D. 1890) (following Irons v.
Smallpiece, 106 Eng. Rep. 467, 468 (KB. 1819) (stating that a gift of goods is not
valid without delivery)); 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 441 (1766) (stating that "[a true] and proper gift... is always accompa-
nied with delivery of possession").
79. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 31.1 cmt. b
(1992).
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requirement of delivery, a gift speaks to the present. A gift of
$50,000 would be complete on delivery. The wrench of delivery
would have brought home to Jack the finality of the transaction
in a way that no promise could have done. If Jack gives Peter
$50,000 right now he is likely to be more reflective than if he
promises to give Peter $50,000 upon his death. It is an appeal-
ing notion that we are more competent in ordering our present
actions than our future ones. If, then, we are less able to protect
ourselves against the possibility of "second thoughts" in cases of
promises to make gifts than in cases of present gifts, paternal-
ism may seem more justifiable in cases of promises.
Second, because of the delivery requirement, a gift is limited
to what one has. This intuitive truth is embodied in the maxim
nemo dat quod non habet, or one cannot give what one does not
have.8" Even a profligate Jack could give Peter only what he
had; Jack would be powerless to squander his future by means
of a gift. Jack could not give $50,000 to Peter unless he had the
$50,000 to deliver. Nevertheless, he could have promised to give
$50,000 to Jack though he had not so much as a penny. Indeed,
Jack might have purported to commit not only his present for-
tune but also whatever he might acquire in the future.8 For this
reason, it may seem that paternalism is more justifiable in cases
of promises.
It is difficult to suppress the suspicion that there is a strong
undercurrent of paternalism in denying one the power to make a
promise on the ground that limiting one's profligacy is in one's
own best interests. Otherwise, what would prevent one from
committing oneself to give everything that one would acquire
during the rest of one's life? It may be remembered that a profli-
gate Fyodor Dostoevsky once gambled nine years of his future
output on his ability to write a novel of at least 160 pages by a
deadline that was only several months away.82
80. See 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 229 n.1
(1965) (discussing the meaning and history of the phrase).
81. In addition to having these two salient characteristics, a gift ordinarily has
the practical advantage of being self-executing, whereas a promise almost invariably
requires a remedy. Once there has been delivery, nothing is ordinarily needed by
way of remedy. Judicial inertia, then, may argue in favor of upholding a gift but not
a promise of a gift.
82. Dostoevsky made the deadline by dictating a 200-page novel, The Gambler, in
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In rationalizing the delivery requirement, legal scholars have
not emphasized the paternalistic effect of nemo dat, preferring
instead to explain delivery as a desirable formality.13 Delivery
not only provides some evidence that the promisor had the req-
uisite intention to make a present transfer, but delivery also
exerts a cautionary impact to assure that the intention resulted
from reflection and deliberation." This reasoning is difficult to
.accept in the face of the power of an owner of personal property
to circumvent the delivery requirement by a mere oral declara-
tion of trust. Under the law of trusts, as developed during the
less than a month. See JOSEPH FRANK, DOSTOEVSKY: THE MIRACULOUS YEARS 1865-
1871, at 32, 58, 162-63 (1995); LEONID GROSSMAN, DOSTOEVSKY: A BIOGRAPHY 391-96
(Mary Mackler trans., 1975).
83. A variation of this argument is that promises that are the product of bargains
differ significantly from promises to make gifts because it is much less common to
qualify the latter to take account of regret. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE L.J. 1261,
1304-05 (1980). When there is no bargaining process, promisors are unlikely to quali-
fy their promises to take account of regret. See id. If such unqualified promises were
binding, parties might even be discouraged from making them. Paternalism, there-
fore, counsels that promises to make gifts should be denied enforcement. See id.
This distinction is questionable. It is reported that entrepreneurs often drive
hard bargains when they make gifts, and that donors increasingly attach strings to
gifts to institutions of higher education because, as one fundraiser put it, "[ylou
want to feel your gift has impact, and know how it will be used in fairly exacting
detail." Karen W. Arenson, Alumni Generosity Has a Catch, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19,
1995, § 4, at 5 (quoting Edward Resovsky, director of principal gifts at the Universi-
ty of Pennsylvania). The assumption that bargaining generally accompanies exchange
ignores the prevalence of adhesion contracts, in which there is no bargaining whatso-
ever over conditions. See, e.g., Mathews v. Sears Pension Plan, 144 F.3d 461, 465
(7th Cir.) ("Printed form contracts, sometimes called 'contracts of adhesion,' are as
numerous as the grains of sand on a beach."), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 618 (1998).
84. See Philip Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of
Choses in Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments (pt. 1), 21 U. ILL. L. REV.
341, 348-49 (1926). So strong was the attachment at common law to the delivery
requirement that it was even argued that delivery was not a mere formality evi-
dencing the intention to give, but was a substantive element of the act of giving
itself. See Cochrane v. Moore, 25 L.T.R. 57, 75 (Q.B.D. 1890) (Esher, M.R., concur-
ring).
The effect of a donor's delivery to a donee differs from that of a seller's delivery
to a buyer. A seller is bound by a commitment to deliver, whereas a donor is not.
Compare 3 FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 12.11 (discussing damages available to a
buyer when a seller fails to perform), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 32
cmt. b & illus.1-2 (1959) (noting that a donor is not bound to deliver property to a
donee, even if an oral promise or written deed is made).
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nineteenth century, Jack could have created a self-declared trust
of $50,000 by a simple declaration that he, as trustee, held the
property in trust for Peter as beneficiary. Unlike a gift, no deliv-
ery of the property is required because the donor is both the
creator of the trust and the trustee. Unlike a promise of a gift,
the declaration of trust need not even be communicated to the
donee or to anyone else, although it must be manifested by some
external expression. 5 In this sense, the declaration is more like
a resolution than a promise.8 6 It is, to say the least, anomalous
that the liberal law of trusts requires no formality, even though
the rigorous law of gifts insists on delivery.17 It is possible, to be
sure, that the impact of the liberal nature of the law of trusts is
mitigated by the circumstance that few nonlawyers are likely to
be aware of this device for avoiding the requirement imposed by
the law of gifts. Indeed, Jack Tallas may well have been a case
in point. Even under the law of trusts, however, the paternalis-
tic restraint of nemo dat remains. A donor can include in the
trust property only what the donor owns at the time of the dec-
laration of trust, not what the donor may later acquire."
So much for paternalism in the general rule that denies a
promisor the power to make a binding promise to make a gift. I
turn now to the two leading exceptions to the general rule, in-
volving promises to perform a "moral obligation" and promises
on which a party has relied. In both of these contexts an under-
current of paternalism is evident.
85. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 24 cmt. c.
86. Although the trust that is created is commonly revocable, it may be irrevoca-
ble. See id. § 37 cmt. a. Even if revocable, however, it can 'no longer be revoked
after the donor's death. See id. § 57 cmt. a, illus.l.
87. It is difficult to explain the anomaly on the ground that in the case of a trust
the donor must assume a fiduciary relationship to the donee. An authority on trusts
has written that "[it is at least a matter for argument whether the requirement of
delivery is a survival of a more primitive system of law in which symbolism is more
important than intention." 1 AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 31, at 331 (4th ed. 1987); see also John H.
Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 672
(1995) (explaining that the "declaration functions as a curative doctrine to excuse
noncompliance with the delivery requirement of the law of gifts").
88. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 32.2 cmt. a
(1992).
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THE SIXTH STAGE: PATERNALISM AND THE
MORAL OBLIGATION EXCEPTION
Suppose that, after a debt has been barred by the statute of
limitations, the debtor makes a new promise to pay the debt
without getting anything in return for that promise. The new
promise would seem to fall within the general rule that promises
without consideration are unenforceable. The new promise is, in
effect, a promise to make a gift. Courts, however, have long
viewed the promise as one to perform a moral obligation, if not a
legal one, and have made an exception to the general rule.89
Even a paternalistic judge is unlikely to be troubled by this
exception because the most profligate promisor can commit no
more than the amount of the barred debt.
There is now good authority for extending this exception to
many other situations in which a promisor promises to perform
what might be regarded as a moral obligation. For example, a
person who is rescued by another is ordinarily under no legal
obligation to the rescuer even if the rescuer has been injured
during the rescue.9 ° Furthermore, a promise made after the
rescue by the person rescued would not be supported by consid-
eration and therefore would not be enforceable under the gener-
al rule.9 ' The promisor, however, may be seen as owing a moral
obligation to the injured rescuer and the promise might be en-
forced under the exception devised for the debt barred by the
statute of limitations.92
Perhaps, Peter could have claimed that Jack's promise was
enforceable under the moral obligation exception, on the ground
that his help to Jack during the fourteen years of their friend-
ship raised a moral obligation on Jack's part to compensate
Peter. In fact, Peter made such a claim, but the court rejected it
on the ground that "the 'moral obligation' exception has not been
embraced in Utah."93
89. See Little v. Blunt, 26 Mass. (9 Pick.) 488 (1830); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRAcTs § 82 (1981).
90. See, e.g., Harrington v. Taylor, 36 S.E.2d 227 (N.C. 1945) (holding that the
rescuer was not entitled to recover for injuries incurred while rescuing the defen-
dant).
91. See id.
92. See Webb v. McGowin, 168 So. 196, 198 (Ala. Ct. App. 1935).
93. Dementas v. Estate of Tallas, 764 P.2d 628, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
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Even if Utah had embraced the rule, at least in its formula-
tion in Section 86 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, Pe-
ter might not have won the $50,000 that he claimed 4 because
the Restatement states that "[a] promise made in recognition of a
benefit previously received by the promisor from the promisee is
binding to the extent necessary to prevent injustice."95 The Re-
statement adds that the promise is not binding "to the extent
that its value is disproportionate to the benefit."96 The court
would have to put an approximate value on the benefit conferred
by Peter over the fourteen years and limit recovery to a sum not
disproportionate to that value. Again, the law's paternalistic
concerns are assuaged by the thought that the promisor's power
to commit the future is limited by the benefit received in the
past.
Scholars have attempted to rationalize this exception on a
variety of grounds.9 It seems both simpler and more convincing
to say that because in the moral obligation cases the promisor's
power to commit the future is limited, courts are able to recog-
nize the promisor's interest in making a binding promise with-
out the paternalistic concern for profligacy that underlies the
general rule.98
94. The court held that the exception would not apply because Peter's services
"were not rendered with the expectation of being compensated, but were performed
gratuitously." Id.
95. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 86(1) (1981).
96. Id. § 86(2)(b).
97. It has been emphasized that the promise reinforces the claim that there is an
obligation. See PATRICK S. ATIYAH, PROMISES, MORALS, AND LAW 70 (1981); Fuller,
supra note 56, at 822. Conversely, it has been suggested that the obligation rein-
forces the claim that there is a promise. See Posner, supra note 24, at 418; see also
Samuel Stoljar, Enforcing Benevolent Promises, 12 SYDNEY L. REv. 17, 38 (1989)
("[Tihe promisee has good reason to suppose that the promise is meant seriously.").
In addition, it has been claimed that in such cases the promisor is better able to
negotiate conditions of the promise than in the case of the usual promise to make a
gift. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 83, at 1311.
98. For an argument that, at least in the case of a debt barred by the statute of
limitations, enforcement will be advantageous to the promisor in the future, see
Posner, supra note 24, at 418.
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THE SEVENTH STAGE: PATERNALISM AND THE
RELIANCE EXCEPTION
Other decisions enforcing promises to make gifs turn on the
fact that the promisee has relied on the promise. Under this
exception, the promisor commonly is said to be "estopped," or
precluded, from reneging on the promise as a result of the
promisee's reliance.99 Despite difficulties in fixing the contours of
Section 90, courts have welcomed it during the more than half a
century since it first appeared-roughly the period during which
the seal has been deprived of its effect. What has now become of
the law's paternalistic concerns? The present version of Section
90 answers this question by giving the court discretion to limit
the promisor's liability to the extent of the promisee's reliance.'00
By exercising this discretion, a court may limit even the most
profligate promisor's power to commit the future to the amount
of the promisee's proven reliance. Peter did not claim that he
had relied on Jack's promise during the six weeks between
Jack's promise and his death, but even if he had relied on Jack's
promise, for example, by buying a car for $20,000, the court
could have limited liability under Section 90 to $20,000 rather
than $50,000. As in the moral obligation cases, the thought that
even a profligate promisor's power is limited assuages the law's
paternalistic concerns.
Denying Jack the power to make a binding promise to give
Peter $50,000 is hard to square with the exception on liability
for charitable subscriptions-promises to make gifts to chari-
ties-that was grafted onto Section 90 when the Restatement
(Second) was drafted.' 1 The exception dispenses with any re-
quirement of reliance in the case of charitable subscriptions,
making them "binding... without proof that the promise in-
duced action or forbearance."' It thus distinguishes promises
made to charities from promises made to family or friends. The
99. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 2.19.
100. See RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF CONTRAcTs § 90(1) ("The remedy granted for
breach may be limited as justice requires.").
101. See id. § 90(2) cmt. f & reporter's note.
102. Id. § 90(2). For an explanation of the origins of this exception, see 1
FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 2.19.
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impact is less significant than it might at first appear, however,
because courts have long been creative in warping the doctrine
of consideration to enforce charitable subscriptions.10 3 Neverthe-
less, if Utah followed the charitable subscriptions doctrine, it
would lead to the extraordinary result that Jack could have
made an enforceable promise over the telephone to give $50,000
to the University of Utah in response to a call from a fnidraiser,
though he could not make such a promise to his friend Peter no
matter what formality he used. In contrast to the law during the
heyday of the seal, the rule for charitable subscriptions does not
require a formality to serve a cautionary function3 4 Admittedly
no such requirement is imposed for a promise to perform a mor-
al obligation or a promise that has been relied on. In that situ-
ation, however, the magnitude of the moral obligation or the ex-
tent of the reliance acts as a limit on a promisor's liability. The
rule for charitable subscriptions has no such limit.
The exception for charitable subscriptions has played to mixed
reviews. 10 5 Courts have been less than pellucid in assessing such
103. See Barnes v. Perine, 12 N.Y. 18, 24 (1854) ("[Jludges . . . have been willing,
nay apparently anxious, to discover a consideration which would uphold the under-
taking . . . ."). A common solution was to find that the promises of subscribers were
consideration for each other, a solution that was especially inviting if one subscriber
was the bellwether of the flock. See Congregation B'nai Sholom v. Martin, 173
N.W.2d 504, 510 (Mich. 1969).
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 303 cmt. b.
105. Compare Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974)
(favorable), with Maryland Nat'l Bank v. United Jewish Appeal, 407 A.2d 1130 (Md.
1979) (unfavorable).
In 1989, a New Jersey intermediate appellate court supported the exception by
holding that a living donor was committed to honor a $2000 oral pledge that he
admitted making. See Jewish Fed'n v. Barondess, 560 A.2d 1353, 1354 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1989). The court's decision emphasized enforcing society's interest in
such sensible displays of altruism. See id. Reliance, the court observed, "is . . . a
questionable basis for enforcing a charitable subscription... because in reality, a
charity does not rely on a particular subscription when planning its undertak-
ings.... The real basis for enforcing a charitable subscription is one of public poli-
cy-that enforcement of a charitable subscription is a desirable social goal." Id.; see
also More Game Birds in Am., Inc. v. Boettger, 14 A.2d 778, 780 (N.J. 1940) (dis-
cussing the enforcement of charitable subscriptions).
In the same year, however, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held
that a promisor's estate was not committed by a $25,000 oral charitable subscription.
See Congregation Kadimah Toras-Moshe v. DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d 691, 693 (Mass. 1989).
Declining to dispense with the requirement of reliance, the court ruled that inclusion
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important factors as whether the promise was written or oral
and whether the promisor reneged before death or simply
died.10 6 Scholarly efforts to justify the exception have been var-
ied.10
7
At one extreme, the exception for charitable subscriptions
restores the promisor's power over such promises to what it was
before the abolition of the seal, but it does so without the re-
quirement of a signed writing to perform a cautionary func-
tion.06 At the other extreme, general adherence to the common
law rule means that no formality whatsoever will suffice to en-
able a promisor to make a binding promise to make a gift, for
example, in a family setting.0 9
If a promise to make a gift were binding, questions would
inevitably arise as to when, if ever, a promisor is free to renege
on such a promise. Such questions are unavoidable even now
because there are exceptions to the general rule and enlarging
the *category of binding promises will only increase their fre-
quency. It seems safe to hypothesize that the less tolerant a
legal system is in excusing promisors from their promises, the
more hesitant courts would be in finding promises to be binding.
If that is so, judges must fashion excuses if courts are to enforce
more promises to make gifts.
of the promised sum in the promisee's budget did not meet the requirement. See id.
The court distinguished earlier cases "because they involved written, as distinguished
from oral, promises and also involved substantial consideration or reliance." Id. Even
assuming that the court would follow the exception for charitable subscriptions in an
appropriate case, the court saw no injustice in refusing to enforce the decedents oral
promise after his death. See id.
106. See, e.g., DeLeo, 540 N.E.2d at 693.
107. The judicial assumption that public policy in favor of charitable giving sup-
ports the enforceability of charitable subscriptions can be faulted on the ground that
the enforceability might discourage such giving by increasing the cost to the donor of
making pledges. See Posner, supra note 24, at 420. Instead, it has been suggested
that the exception may rest on "the large size of many charitable [pledges] and the
(related) desire of the donor to spread payment [out] . . . over . . . time." Id. Final-
ly, it also has been suggested that, in comparison to a family setting, a charitable
setting provides more opportunity for a donor to bargain over conditions and there-
fore extralegal sanctions are less likely to be effective. See Goetz & Scott, supra note
83, at 1307-08.
108. See RESTATEIENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 303 cmt. b.
109. See 1 FARNSWORTH, supra note 33, § 2.19, at 156-57.
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Those who make such promises are no more immune from
regretting that they have done so than are other promisors.
When Richard H. Barclay, a seventy-two-year-old, self-made real
estate developer, died without paying $600,000 of the $1 million
he had promised the University of California for a new theater,
his widow found herself enmeshed in a legal battle with the Uni-
versity. She protested that her husband's estate could afford to
pay no more than $250,000 because he had suffered heavy losses
shortly before his death."' One might therefore expect that the
same courts that have lavished so much attention on rules to
deal with regret in cases of conventional bilateral contracts
would have paid some attention to the analogous questions
posed under promises to make gifts. Until now, they have not
answered these questions and, in the light of the many excep-
tional circumstances in which promises to make gifts turn out to
be binding, it behooves one who makes such a promise to fash-
ion explicit provisions that take account of the possibility of
regret. Although it might sometimes be prudent to make only a
promise to use "best efforts" to make the gift, this is not usually
what is intended.
Any proposal to enlarge the category of binding promises must
therefore address the question of how courts should deal with
regret when the promisor has been silent."' In broad outline,
the reasons for their regret are not very different from the rea-
sons considered above in the case of persons who swap their
promises. When, in the words of Section 90, can "injustice... be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise"?"
Should courts turn a deaf ear to excuses such as those based
on medical emergencies, financial reverses, and even unexpected
110. See John Murawski, Charities' Lawsuit Dilemma, CHRON. OF PHILANTHROPY,
Mar. 9, 1995, at 1; Richard B. Schmitt, Uncharitable Acts: If Donors Fail to Give,
More Nonprofit Groups Take Them to Court, WALL ST. J., July 27, 1995, at Al.
111. For a case suggesting that the enforceability of a charitable pledge may turn
on whether the pledge contains conditions, see Mount Sinai Hosp. v. Jordan, 290 So.
2d 484, 486-87 (Fla. 1974) (holding a pledge unenforceable against the pledgor's
estate because "the donative intent as to the specific material plan .. . must be
made an integral part of the pledge instrument, limiting the exercise of discretion
by the donee. . ."). For a case suggesting the reluctance of courts to read in condi-
tions when a donor has not been explicit, see Danby v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 104
A.2d 903, 906 (Del. 1954).
112. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90(1).
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competing business opportunities? Should the law imply that a
person who promises to make a gift assumed such risks? Should
the law imply that Samuel LeFrak assumed the risk that the
Landmarks Preservation Commission would not approve the
LeFrak name on the exterior of the Guggenheim Museum's
rotunda?113 Should the law ignore even a devastating reversal of
fortune? As far back as the second century, the Roman emperor
Antoninus Pius established the rule that "those who are sued in
order to secure a liberality [i.e., a gratuity] are to be condemned
for what they can afford."" An analogy might be found in cases
defining the implied right of a donor to recover a gift causa mor-
tis after making an unexpected recovery. 1 5 Courts might find
contemporary inspiration in an Israeli statute that allows a
promisor to retract a promise to make a gift, even after reliance,
"if the retraction is warranted... by a considerable deteriora-
tion in the [promisor's] economic situation." 6
113. See Vogel, supra note 15, at 13.
114. DIG. 50.17.28 (Ulpian, Sabinus 36), translated in 4 THE DIGEST OF JusTINAN
958a (Theodor Mommsen & Paul Krueger eds., Alan Watson trans., U. Pa. Press
1985). For a suggestion that the phrase "if injustice can be avoided" in Section 90
"might have served a useful purpose if it directed the attention of the courts to the
issues of improvidence and ingratitude," see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Donative Promises,
47 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 23 (1979).
115. See RAY ANDREWS BROWN, THE LAW OF PERSONAL PROPERTY § 7.15 (Walter B.
Raushenbush ed., 3d ed. 1975). The analogy is imperfect because such a gift is con-
sidered to be revocable on recovery rather than conditional.
116. 22 L.S.I. 113, (1967-68). Both French and German statutes that apply to gifts
as well as promises take account of a similar donor's right by imposing implied
conditions that allow a donor to revoke a gift in specified circumstances of ingrati-
tude or changed circumstances. See Farnsworth, supra note 71, at 376 nn.71-72.
For more on French law, see DAWSON, supra note 53, at 53 (describing three
grounds derived from Roman law: (1) the donee's ingratitude, defined as an attempt
on the donor's life, "cruelty and grave wrongs or injuries," and refusal of support; (2)
the donee's failure to perform an express condition; and (3) a previously childless
donor's acquisition of a child); see also Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 14 n.49 (giving
as examples of ingratitude "the infidelity of a spouse . . . and a serious libel in
open court against the donor").
For more on German law, see DAWSON, supra note 53, at 140-41. In comment-
ing on German law, Dawson describes the grounds as the donee's "gross ingrati-
tude," the "donor's subsequent impoverishment," and "the donee's failure to perform
a condition." Id.; see also Eisenberg, supra note 114, at 15 n.50 (noting as a ground
the donee's not being in a position "to return the gift without endangering his own
maintenance suitable to his station in life, or the fulfillment of the duties imposed
upon him by law to furnish maintenance to others").
408 WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:385
The challenge for courts is to adapt rules constructed to deal
with the effects of the other party's breach in a conventional ex-
change to situations involving the unfulfilled expectations of the
promisor of a gift.117  The circumstances giving rise to a
promisor's regret for having made a gift are subject to myriad
permutations. For instance, what if one is shocked at inefficient
food distribution by one's chosen charity; startled at the unavail-
ability of one's expected tax deduction; dismayed by recovery
from the illness one supposed to be terminal; irritated at the
insensitivity of one's law school classmates to one's generosity;
displeased by the emphasis of the botanical garden on carnivo-
rous plants;" 8 or outraged at the unexpected ingratitude of one's
intended recipient? How, if at all, should the law take account of
regret in such situations? Is it significant that the promisee has
at least some responsibility for the promisor's regret? An analo-
gy might be found in decisions addressing the implied right of a
jilted fianc6 to recover the gift of an engagement ring."' At least
some of these situations would fall within the further provision
of the Israeli statute that allows a promisor to retract a promise
to make a gift, even after reliance, "if the retraction is warrant-
ed by disgraceful conduct towards the [promisor] or a member of
the [promisor's] family."2 '
If common law courts were to fashion conditions for promises to make gifts, it
would not be difficult to adapt those conditions to completed gifts, but no common
law court has gone this far. I have made similar comparisons of the ways various
nations treat promises to make gifts in a brief, earlier work. See Farnsworth, supra
note 71, at 376 nn.70-72. The analysis here builds on these former comparisons.
117. For examples of charitable pledgors who were bound nevertheless, see Danby
v. Osteopathic Hosp. Ass'n, 104 A.2d 903 (Del. 1954) (illustrating one such situation
in which a hospital changed its plans for construction based on personal guarantee
of its bank loan by a charitable pledgor); Salsbury v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co.,
221 N.W.2d 609 (Iowa 1974) (indicating that a pledgee's attempt to establish a col-
lege collapsed when a charitable pledgor refused to effectuate his pledge); Congrega-
tion B'nai Sholom v. Martin, 173 N.W.2d 504 (Mich. 1969) (holding that a pledgor
who had disputes with other members of the congregation and attempted to with-
draw his pledge was still bound by it).
118. See PANAS, supra note 27, at 163 (stating that [aifter H. Ross Perot gave $2
million and pledged $6 million more for a Dallas arboretum, few bonds were sold to
raise additional money and "Perot decided that the arboretum would never become a
world-class facility" and "wanted to withdraw his gift').
119. See BROWN, supra note 115, § 7.13, at 122.
120. 22 L.S.I. 113.
PROMISES AND PATERNALISM
This country has yet to develop a coherent set of answers. 1 2 1
Answers are needed even now because of the exceptions for
moral obligation and reliance, and this need will increase as the
category of binding promises is enlarged, as has been attempted
in the case of charitable subscriptions. If one assumes that the
more tolerant a legal system is of reneging on binding promises,
the more likely it will be to treat promises as binding, it follows
that the expansion of the category of binding promises to make
gifts will depend on the fashioning of excuses to take account of
regret.
Yet if the technicality of a peppercorn will suffice to make a
promise binding, why not the formality of a signed writing? This
would, to be sure, require legislation. But a distinguished
comparatist has asked whether, "for a legal system which lacks
the institution of a notary in the civil-law sense, it is wholly
impossible to create a fair equivalent of a civil-law-style notarial
document,"2 2 and whether a document signed with the advice of
counsel and filed in a public place might be such a fair equiva-
lent.'2' I share this sympathetic view of the intention principle,
though I doubt that the formality needs to be this elaborate. A
Canadian commission has recommended a simpler formality,
proposing enactment of a statute providing that a witnessed,
signed writing take the place of the seal."
Whatever the appropriate formality, the abolition of the seal
without the substitution of some other formality is rash. To deny
the power to make enforceable promises on the ground that an
appropriate formality cannot be fashioned seems absurd.
121. An attempt to develop such rules might not be "worth the candle." Eisenberg,
supra note 114, at 15.
122. RuDOLF B. SCHLESINGER ET AL., COMPARATIVE LAW 22 (5th ed. 1988).
123. See id.
124. See ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMN, REPORT ON AMENDMENT OF THE LAW OF
CONTRACT 292 (1987) (proposing that the writing be executed "in the presence of a
witness and signed by the witness in the presence of the executing party").
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